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Ballistic missiles and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons operate using sim-
ilar technological means but not with the same level of technology or en-
gineering maturity. ASATs require more sophisticated systems engineering
and integration requirements to adapt to the challenges posed by an ASAT
intercept. The main difficulties arise from the requirements for detection
in space and the high closing velocities needed to execute an ASAT inter-
cept [1]. These difficulties have been underestimated after the recent Chinese
ASAT test by those who have suggested that other nations could in the near-
future master this technology gap and convert their primitive ballistic missile
capabilities into an effective ASAT weapons capability.
This report examines whether Iran could use its modest missile capability
to project a viable ASAT threat to US Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites.
The study suggests that, even if Iran has an Intermediate Range Ballistic
Missile (IRBM), it would not be easily able to leap-frog the technology gap
from a ballistic missile to an ASAT capability. Unless it develops and tests
the system vigorously and visibly, Iran would not project an ASAT threat.
Chapter 1 of the report analyzes the capability of the Iranian Shahab-
4 missile, including the velocity attained by the missile at an altitude of
1000 kilometers. Chapter 2 provides an analysis of the total thermal en-
ergy emitted by a model satellite in the Infrared (IR) band of interest for
the given ASAT characteristics. Using the total thermal energy in the IR
band, the detection range from which the ASAT can lock on to the satellite
is determined. Chapter 3 details both, the ideal and real-time Proportional
Navigation Guidance (PNG) law simulation performed using the parame-
ters obtained in Chapters 1 and 2. The miss distances and acceleration
requirements are shown graphically to capture the nuances and limits in the
capability of an ASAT based on current Iranian technology level. The con-
clusion explains the limits and assumptions of this analysis and scope for
further work.
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In the analysis undertaken for this study, a three stage missile, the
Iranian Shahab-4 is taken as the baseline anti-satellite weapon. This missile
is used as the baseline since it is the most advanced missile that Iran is
presumed to possess. The capability of the missile and the altitude that
it can attain when launched vertically on a path into space as opposed to
against a target in earth are ascertained using the Rocket equations.
1.1 The Rocket Equation for Multiple Stages




) = −Ve1ln(r1) (1.1)
where ∆V1 is the total change in velocity imparted to the rocket body using
the propellant of the first stage after the first stage burnout. Similarly
∆V2 = −Ve2ln(r2) (1.2)
Assuming Ve1 = Ve2 = Ve
∆V1 + ∆V2 = −Veln(r1) − Veln(r2) = −Veln(r1r2). (1.3)


















mfinal,k = mpayload + minert,k +
n∑
j=k+1
(mpropellant,j + minert,j) (1.6)
and
Ve = Ispg (1.7)
Using equation 1.4 the total ∆V capability or lift capacity and altitude at-
tained can be determined.
1.2 Shahab-4 or IRSL X-2
The satellite launch version of the Shahab-4 is called the IRSL X-2.
IRSL X-2 is used in this study as the launch vehicle for the Anti-satellite
(ASAT) weapon. It is a Taepodong-1 missile with a third stage and satellite
(as payload) added. The technical characteristics of the Taepodong-1 based
IRSL X-2 are listed in table 1.1 below [9]. Iran has attempted to use this
vehicle to launch satellites, albeit without success.
Table 1.1: Parameters of Shahab 4
Diameter 0.8 − 1.3 m
Height 25 m
Launch Weight 22, 000 kg
Thrust 26, 000 kg − f





Payload 50 − 100 kg
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1.3 ∆V Capability of IRSL X-2
The first stage of the IRSL X-2 is the No-dong missile, the second stage
is a modified SCUD-B, and the third stage is a solid motor. The various
stage parameters are detailed in tables 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 [9].
1.3.1 Stage-1 (No-dong)
The characteristics of the first stage are listed in table 1.2. The ∆V of
the first stage is determined using equation 1.4 and the respective dry and
wet masses of the stages.
Table 1.2: Stage-1 parameters of IRSL X-2
Height approx. 14 m with inter − stage truss sturcture
Diameter 1.32 to 1.35 m
Launch Weight 15, 100 kg
Thrust (Actual) 31, 260 kg − f
Isp 230 s at sea level
Burn Time 95 s
Fuel TM − 185 (20 percent gasoline + 80 percent Kerosene)
Oxidiser AK − 27I (27 percent N2O4 + 73 percent HNO3 + Inhibitor)
Propellant Mass 12, 912 kg
minitial = 15, 100 kg + 5, 770 kg + 1, 000 kg = 21, 870 kg (1.8)
mfinal = 21, 870 − 12, 912 = 8, 958 kg (1.9)
Ve = g ∗ Isp = 9.81(230) = 2256 m/s (1.10)
Using the rocket equation the ∆V of the first stage is
∆V1stStage = −Veln( mfinal
minitial
) = 2014 m/s (1.11)
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1.3.2 Stage-2 (SCUD-B)
The characteristics of the second stage are listed in table 1.3. In a
similar fashion to the previous calculations the ∆V of the second stage is
determined using equation 1.4 and the respective dry and wet masses of the
stages 2 and 3 and payload weight.
Table 1.3: Stage-2 parameters of IRSL X-2
Height 10 m
Diameter 0.88 m
Launch Weight 5, 260 to 5, 770 kg
Thrust 6, 690 − 7, 523 kg − f at 50 − 55 percent thrust
Burn Time < 171 s
Fuel TM − 185 (20 percent gasoline + 80 percent Kerosene)
Oxidiser AK − 27I (27 percent N2O4 + 73 percent HNO3 + Inhibitor)
minitial = 5, 770 kg + 1, 000 kg = 6, 770 kg (1.12)
Assuming that 86 percent of the initial weight is propellant weight
mpropellant = 0.86(6, 770) = 5822 kg (1.13)
hence
mfinal = 6, 770 − 5822 = 948 kg (1.14)




) = 4436 m/s (1.16)
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1.3.3 Stage-3 (Solid Motor)
The characteristics of the second stage are listed in table 1.4. The ∆V
of the third stage is determined using equation 1.4 and the mass of the third
stage and payload weight.
minitial = 1, 000 kg (1.17)
Let
mfinal = payload weight = 200 kg (1.18)
Assuming the Isp of the solid motor propellant to be 200 s,
Ve = Isp ∗ g = 200(9.81) = 1962 m/s (1.19)
Thus,
∆V3rdstage = 3158 m/s (1.20)
Table 1.4: Stage-3 Solid Motor parameters of IRSL X-2
Height 1 or 2 m
Diameter 0.65 m
Launch Weight approx. 550 − 1000 kg total package
1.4 Total ∆V capability of missile
∆Vtot = ∆V1ststage + ∆V2ndstage + ∆V3rdstage (1.21)
∆Vtot = 2014 + 4436 + 3158 = 9608 m/s. (1.22)
A simulation was run with this total ∆V capability to determine the alti-
tude the missile can reach and the velocity at an assumed intercept altitude
of 1000 km. The simulation was run using initial simplifying assumptions
5
of an impulsive missile, a flat-earth and non-rotating earth model, zero-drag
and constant gravity with respect to altitude.
Maximum Altitude for given ∆Vtot = 4703 km (1.23)
V elocity of missile at 1000 km = 8528 m/s. (1.24)
Using the velocity of the missile at 1000 km the capability of the missile to
execute an ASAT intercept at the altitude can be studied thereby providing





An important parameter in executing an ASAT intercept is the ability
of the missile to map and image the thermal signature of the satellite. This
function is directly dependent on the imaging sensors employed by the ASAT
missile. This chapter analyzes this particular capability of the IRSL X-2 to
mount such an imaging system on their missile systems.
A model LEO satellite is selected for the purpose of this study. The di-
mensions of the satellite were taken from the NASA Imager for Magnetosphere-
to-Aurora Global Exploration (IMAGE) satellite [7]. The shape of the satel-
lite is a octagonal cylinder with the following parameters.
Diameter = 237 cm ≈ 2.4 m (2.1)
Width of each face = 90 cm = 0.9 m (2.2)
Height of each octagonal face = 136 cm ≈ 1.4 m (2.3)
The surface area of the eight faces of the octagon are
= 8 ∗ (0.9 ∗ 1.4) = 10 m2 (2.4)
The surface area of the top and bottom octagonal surfaces is determined by
diving the surfaces of the octagon into eight isosceles triangles with base of
90 cm and two equal sides of 118.5 cm (the radius of the octagon). Using
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the Pythagorean theorem, the height of each triangle is found to be 110 cm.
Thus the surface area of each isosceles triangle is
= (1/2 ∗ 110 ∗ 90) = 4950 cm2 ≈ 0.5 m2 (2.5)
The area of both the octagonal surfaces is
= 2 ∗ 8 ∗ 0.5 = 8 m2 (2.6)
Thus the total surface area of the satellite is
= 10 + 8 = 18 m2 (2.7)
2.1 Temperature of Satellite in Low Earth
Orbit (LEO) Facing the Sun
For an object in thermal equilibrium in space,
PE = PA + PI (2.8)
where PE is the power emitted by the object, PA is the power absorbed by
the object, and PI is any power generated internally by the object.
PE = AsεIRσT
4 (2.9)
PA = Ac [(S + SR)αV + αIRE] (2.10)
where As and Ac are the surface area and average cross-sectional area of the
satellite, εIR is the emissivity averaged over the the IR band, σ is the Stefan-
Boltzmann constant, S is the solar flux, SR is the solar flux reflected from the
earth (albedo flux= 0.3S), E is the earth infrared flux (about 240 W/m2),
αV is the satellite absorptivity averaged over the visible and near infrared
band, and αIR is the satellite absorptivity averaged over the IR band. For
this calculation, the power internally generated is assumed as
PI = 100 W (2.11)
For the given satellite
As = 18 m
2 (2.12)
To determine average cross-sectional area Ac, it is assumed that the top
and bottom surfaces of the satellite are pointed in a direction perpendicular
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to the sun and earth and that the side surfaces are facing the sun and earth.
Therefore, the average cross-sectional area is the projected surface area of
the satellite facing the sun which is rectangular surface with the width (i.e.
diameter) and height of the octagonal satellite
Ac = 2.4 ∗ 1.4 = 3.4 m2 (2.13)
S = 1360 W/m2 (2.14)
SR = 0.3S = 408 W/m
2 (2.15)
E = 240 W/m2 (2.16)
Assuming εIR = αIR = 0.8 (2.17)
and
αV = 0.2 (2.18)
For the satellite in thermal equilibrium,
AsεIRσT
4 = Ac [(S + SR)αV + αIRE] + PI (2.19)
18 ∗ 0.8 ∗ 5.67 ∗ 10−8 ∗ T 4 = 3.4 [1360(1.3)0.2 + 0.8(240)] + 100 (2.20)
Hence the temperature of the satellite in LEO facing the sun is
T = 221 K (2.21)
2.2 Temperature of Satellite in Low Earth
Orbit(LEO) in Earth’s Shadow
In earth’s shadow
PA = AcαIRE (2.22)
For thermal equilibrium
AsεIRσT
4 = AcαIRE + PI (2.23)
Hence the temperature of the satellite in LEO in earth’s shadow is
T = 174 K (2.24)
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2.3 Total Thermal Energy Emitted by the
Satellite in the 4 − 5µ.m
This analysis assumes that Iran would have access to a Indium Anti-
monide (InSb) kind of array for IR detection. Although these arrays have
a theoretical wavelength detection range from 2 µ.m to 6 µ.m, their actual
operating range is restricted to 4 µ.m to 5 µ.m due to transmitting window
characteristics and other practical issues. Therefore, the energy emitted is
measured in the band of 4 µ.m to 5 µ.m.
The total emissive power of a black body is given by
Eb = σT
4 (2.25)
where σ, the Stefan-Boltzmann constant is 5.67 ∗ 10−8 W/m2.K4
Thus the corresponding total emissive power when the satellite is in sun-
light is
E1 = σ ∗ 2214 = 135 W/m2 (2.26)
and the total emissive power when the satellite is in Earth’s shadow is
E2 = σ ∗ 1744 = 52 W/m2 (2.27)
2.3.1 Total Thermal Energy when Satellite is Sunlit
If λ1 = 4 µ.m and λ2 = 5 µ.m then
λ1T = 4(221) = 884 µ.m − K (2.28)
and the corresponding black body radiating function is given as
F0→λ1 = 0.0001441 (2.29)
The black body radiating function is determined through standard
tables that are derived from integration of Stefan-Boltzmann Law. For a
prescribed temperature and the wavelength interval from 0 to λ, this fraction
is determined by the ratio of the energy in the band to the total energy under

















d(λT ) = f(λT ) (2.30)
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Since the integrand (
Eλ,b
σT 5
) is exclusively a function of the wavelength-temperature
product λT , the above integral may be evaluated to obtain F0→λ as a function









= F(0→λ2) − F(0→λ1). (2.31)
Therefore
λ2T = 5(221) = 1105 µ.m − K (2.32)
and the corresponding black body radiating function is given as
F0→λ2 = 0.0013 (2.33)
From this,
∆F = 0.0012 (2.34)
hence the total energy (φT ) in the 4 − 5µ.m band is
φT = 0.0012(E1) = 0.0012(135) = 0.162 W/m
2 (2.35)
2.3.2 Total Thermal Energy when Satellite is in Earth’s
Shadow
If λ1 = 4 µ.m and λ2 = 5 µ.m then
λ1T = 4(174) = 696 µ.m − K (2.36)
and the corresponding black body radiating function is given as
F0→λ1 = 7.68 ∗ 10−6 (2.37)
Similarly
λ2T = 5(174) = 870 µ.m − K (2.38)
and the corresponding black body radiating function is given as
F0→λ2 = 0.000138 (2.39)
From this,
∆F = 1.3032 ∗ 10−4 (2.40)
hence the total energy (φT ) in the 4 − 5 µ.m band is
φT = 1.3032 ∗ 10−4(E1) = 1.3032 ∗ 10−4(52) = 0.007 W/m2 (2.41)
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Table 2.1: Total energy φT in 4 − 5 µ.m band
Temperature (K) Total energy (W/m2) Total Energy (W)
221 (satellite - sunlit) 0.16 2.88




It is assumed that Iran would use an InSb (Indium Antimonide) seeker
to image the thermal signature of a satellite in LEO. Arrays of 256 × 256
configurations are commercially available. The parameters of this seeker are
D∗(@4.6 µm) = 3.7 ∗ 1012 Jones (2.42)
operating temperature = 77 K, effeciency η = 90 percent, center to center
spacing = 30 µm, and operating wavelength range = 4 − 5 µm.
2.4.1 Determination of Detection Range
The noise equivalent power (NEP) for the detector is given by [6]
NEP =
(Ad ∗ β) 12
D∗
(2.43)
where Ad = 30 ∗ 30 µm2, and bandwidth is β = 50 Hz. Hence NEP =
5.73 ∗ 10−15 W. A Signal to noise (S/N) ratio of 13.6 dB (= 22.9) gives a
90 percent single-look probability of detection with a false alarm probability
of 10−7. Assuming that all the target (satellite) signal power (IR radiation)
reaching the aperture of the seeker is focused onto a single detector element,





where A = optics aperture area, R = range to target, and L = system losses.
This power on the detector φD will be sufficient to detect the target if
φD = (S/N)min ∗ NEP (2.45)
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where (S/N)min = S/N ratio required for detection, and NEP = the incident
power that produces a signal equal to the average noise signal (that is, the
NEP is the incident signal power that gives a signal-to-noise ratio of one).
φD = 22.9 ∗ 5.73 ∗ 10−15 = 1.31 ∗ 10−13 W (2.46)
It is assumed here that the system losses are 20 percent (L = 1.2) and the




= 5 cm (2.47)
The optics aperture area is





= 7.85 ∗ 10−3 m2 (2.48)






Using this equation, the detection ranges (R) for various satellite tempera-
tures in sunlight and earth’s shadow conditions are determined and encap-
sulated in table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Detection Range
Temperature (K) Total energy (W) Detection Range (Km)
221 (satellite - sunlit) 2.88 107
173 (satellite - earth’s shadow) 1.26 71
250 13.14 229
300 108 655
Using these detection range values a guidance simulation algorithm can





The intercept of the anti-satellite (ASAT) missile with a satellite is
simulated with a Proportional Navigation Guidance (PNG) Law [8] using
the 1000 km intercept altitude and the corresponding velocity estimated in
chapter 1 along with the detection range estimated in chapter 2.
3.1 Proportional Navigation Guidance (PNG)
Law
The proportional navigation guidance law issues acceleration commands,
perpendicular to the instantaneous missile-satellite line-of-sight, which are





where nc is the acceleration command, N
′
is a unitless designer-chosen gain
known as as the effective navigation ratio, Vc is the missile-satellite closing
velocity, λ is the line-of-sight angle, and λ̇ is the line-of-sight rate. In the
current analysis where the missile uses IR, the line-of-sight is measured and
closing velocity is estimated from the line-of-sight.
Figure 3.1 represents the engagement geometry. The missile, with velocity
magnitude VM , is heading at an angle L + HE with respect to the line of
sight. The angle L is the missile lead angle. The lead angle is the theoretical
correct angle for the missile to be on a collision course triangle with the
satellite. In other words, if the missile is on a collision triangle, no further
acceleration commands are required for the missile to hit the target. The
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angle HE is the heading error, which represents the initial deviation of the








Figure 3.1: Two-dimensional missile-satellite engagement geometry [8]
The line connecting the missile and the satellite is the line-of-sight. The
line-of-sight makes an angle λ with respect to the reference, and the length
of the line-of-sight which is the instantaneous separation between the missile
and the target satellite is denoted by RTM . The point of closest approach of
the missile and the satellite is known as the miss distance.
The closing velocity Vc is defined as the negative rate of change of the
distance from the missile to the satellite
Vc = −ṘTM (3.2)
Therefore, at the end of engagement, when the missile and target are in
closest proximity, the sign of Vc will change. The closing velocity will be zero
when RTM is a minimum. The desired acceleration command nc, which is
derived from the proportional navigation guidance law, is perpendicular to
the instantaneous line of sight.
In the simulated engagement model, the satellite can maneuver evasively
with acceleration nT . The target satellite acceleration is perpendicular to







where VT is the satellite velocity. The components of the satellite velocity
in the inertial coordinate system are found by integrating the differential
equation for the flight path angle of the satellite, β, and substituting in
VT1 = −VT cosβ (3.4)
VT2 = VT Sinβ (3.5)
Satellite position components can be found by integrating the satellite ve-
locity components. Therefore, the differential equations for the components
of the target position are given by
ṘT1 = VT1 (3.6)
ṘT2 = VT2 (3.7)
Similarly the missile velocity and position differential equations are given by
V̇M1 = aM1 (3.8)
V̇M2 = aM2 (3.9)
ṘM1 = VM1 (3.10)
ṘM2 = VM2 (3.11)
where aM1 and aM2 are the missile acceleration.
The relative missile-satellite separations are
RTM1 = RT1 − RM1 (3.12)
RTM2 = RT2 − RM2 (3.13)






If the relative velocity components in earth coordinates are defined as
VTM1 = VT1 − VM1 (3.15)
VTM2 = VT2 − VM2 (3.16)
we can calculate the line-of-sight rate by direct differentiation of the expres-





The relative separation between the missile and the satellite target, RTM ,









Since the closing velocity is defined as the negative rate of change of the
missile-satellite separation, it can obtained from differentiating equation 3.18
Vc = −ṘTM = − (RTM1VTM1 + RTM2VTM2)
RTM
(3.19)




Since the acceleration command is perpendicular to the instantaneous line-of-
sight, the missile acceleration components can be found in earth coordinates
aM1 = −ncsinλ (3.21)
aM2 = nccosλ. (3.22)
A missile employing PNG is not fired at the target but is fired in a
direction to lead the target satellite. The initial angle of the missile velocity
vector with respect to the line-of-sight is known as the missile lead angle L.
The missile is fired at the expected intercept point. For the missile to be on
a collision triangle, the theoretical missile lead angle is
L = sin−1




In actuality, the location of the intercept point can only be approximated
since there is no prior knowledge of the target maneuver. Any angular devi-
ation of the missile from the collision triangle is known as heading error HE.
The initial missile velocity components can therefore be calculated as
VM1(0) = VMcos(L + HE + λ) (3.24)
VM2(0) = VMsin(L + HE + λ). (3.25)
3.2 Simulation with an idealized PNG-based
ASAT
In simulating an idealized PNG-based ASAT, it is assumed that all
the systems in the anti-satellite (ASAT) missile function as planned and
required. A schematic of an idealized PNG law is shown in figure 3.2. In
reality, the divert thrusters produce only one constant thrust level (either on
or off) rather than a variable thrust, and the navigation system controls only
their on-off pulse time. Thus, the control outputs are on-off commands and
information about the pulse width timing. The performance of a thruster is
characterized by its nominal thrust, thrust repetitiveness, and response time,
which is the time needed for the thrust to rise from 0 to 90 percent of its
nominal value. These parameters determine how fast and how accurately the
ASAT Kill Vehicle (KV) can put itself on a collision course with the target.
In an idealized case all these parameters are assumed to function as required.
In real-world PNG-based ASAT all the systems function with a certain
lag. Latencies in the seeker measurements and latencies in applying the
acceleration command are two dominant factors that affect the intercept
capability of the guidance system. These latencies will cause a significant
miss distance, which would not take place if there were no latencies. The first
two simulations are for an ideal system that does not include these factors.
If Iran is not able to obtain an intercept even under these highly idealized
conditions then it would not be able to do so using a system which has lags
and imperfections built into it. The third simulation involves a real-world
PNG-based ASAT missile.
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Figure 3.2: Ideal representation of PNG system
3.2.1 Simulation Case 1
For the first simulation run in the subroutine, the parameters for the
guidance are mentioned in table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Guidance simulation parameters - Case 1
Horizontal separation 107 km
Vertical separation 107 km
Missile velocity 8.53 km/s
Target satellite velocity 7.35 km/s
Heading error (HE) 0 degrees
Target accleration (nT) 0 G
The horizontal and vertical separation distance between the missile and
the target satellite is determined on the basis of the acquisition range that
is obtained when the satellite is sunlit, which is the best possibility that an
interceptor can have. For the first case the target acceleration and heading





= [3, 4, 5] and for different values of update time, H (the time
between each detector measurements). The final miss distance varies with
19
the update time H and is shown in table 3.2. The intercept geometry, closing
velocity, commanded acceleration and miss distance during the intercept are
shown in the figures 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 respectively. The sudden drop in
closing velocity and the sudden rise in acceleration requirements are due to
the missile and satellite crossing in space which causes a change in directional
perspective.


















Two−dimensional missile−satellite engagement simulation
← Missile N‘ = 3
← Missile N‘ = 4






Figure 3.3: Case 1(H=0.02)
Intercept Geometry































Figure 3.4: Case 1(H=0.02)
Closing Velocity
































Figure 3.5: Case 1(H=0.02)
Commanded acceleration for the
interceptor


























Figure 3.6: Case 1(H=0.02)
Miss Distance at the end of each
time step
3.2.2 Miss Distance for Various Update Intervals
As is seen from table 3.2, the miss distance varies hugely depending
on the update interval (H). In the case of the candidate Iranian system, the
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update interval is 50 Hz or one update per 0.02 seconds. For an update in-
terval of H=0.02, the miss distance is nearly 110 meters, which is a complete
failure of the intercept. For an update interval of H=0.002, the miss distance
is 13 meters which is a substantial improvement in accuracy but still an in-
tercept failure because a miss distance less than 1 meter is the requirement
for a successful ASAT intercept in an head-on collision [2] [3]. Only when
H=0.0002 (i.e. only when the Iranian system is fitted with a IR imaging sys-
tem with 100 times more capability) is it able to make a successful intercept.
But such an improvement in capability of the imaging system is a daunting
engineering task. Improvement of this magnitude requires state of the art
imaging systems that are available only to most technologically advanced
establishments.
Table 3.2: Final miss distance










3.2.3 Simulation Case 2
For the second simulation run in the subroutine, the parameters for the
guidance are in table 3.3. In this simulation case, the target acceleration is
taken as 10G. The leading error is still assumed to be zero.





[3, 4, 5] and for different values of update time, H (the time between each
detector measurements). The final miss distance variation with the update
time H is shown in table 3.4. The intercept geometry, closing velocity, com-
manded acceleration and miss distance during the intercept are shown in the
figures 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 respectively.
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Table 3.3: Guidance simulation parameters - Case 2
Horizontal separation 107 km
Vertical separation 107 km
Missile velocity 8.53 km/s
Target satellite velocity 7.35 km/s
Heading error (HE) 0 degrees
Target accleration (nT) 10 G


















Two−dimensional missile−satellite engagement simulation
← Missile N‘ = 3
← Missile N‘ = 4






Figure 3.7: Case 2(H=0.02)
Intercept Geometry































Figure 3.8: Case 2(H=0.02)
Closing Velocity






























Figure 3.9: Case 2(H=0.02)
Commanded acceleration for the
interceptor


























Figure 3.10: Case 2(H=0.02)
Miss Distance at the end of each
time step
22
3.2.4 Miss distance for various Update intervals
Similar to case 1, the miss distance varies with the update interval (H) for
case 2 with nT = 10G as seen from table 3.4. In the case of the candidate
Iranian system, the update interval is 50 Hz or one update per 0.02 seconds.
For an update interval of H=0.02, the minimum miss distance is 120 meters
which is a failure of the intercept. For an update interval of H=0.002 the
minimum miss distance is 8 meters which is still larger than the requirement
for a head-on collision. A miss distance less than 1 meter is the requirement
for a successful ASAT intercept in a head-on collision [2] [3]. Only when
H=0.0002 (i.e. only when the Iranian system is fitted with a IR imaging
system with 100 times more capability) is the ASAT able to make a successful
intercept. In that case, the minimum miss distance is 0.2 meters at N=3.
Such an improvement of 100 times more imaging capability of the imaging
system is not feasible without access to the most advanced imaging systems.
Table 3.4: Final miss distance










3.3 Simulation of a real-world PNG-based ASAT
In a real-world PNG based ASAT, it is assumed that all the systems
in the anti-satellite (ASAT) missile function with a certain lag. Latencies in
the seeker measurements and latencies in applying the acceleration command
are two dominant factors that affect the intercept capability of the guidance
system. These latencies will cause a significant miss distance, which would
not take place if there were no latencies.
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A binomial series representation of the guidance system dynamics pro-
vides an effective way of modelling a realistic PNG system. A representation










where τ is the guidance system time constant, n is the system order and
H.O.T are higher order terms that can be neglected.
A fifth order system suitable for an analysis is shown in figure 3.11. This
system allocates one time constant for the seeker, one for the noise filter and










The flight control system has a third-order representation to accommo-














Flight Control System 
1 / (1+(s /5))3 1 / (1+(s /5))





Rate of LOS 
angle change
Figure 3.11: Fifth-Order representation of PN guidance system
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3.3.1 Simulation Case 3
For the third simulation run in the subroutine the parameters for the
guidance are as mentioned in table 3.3. But the guidance law is now a real-
world non-ideal PNG law that has system lags.
Since this subroutine operates on the assumption of unbridled accelera-
tion capability, there is no explicit possibility of an acceleration saturation
occurring in the interceptor missile whereby the missile would lose fuel in
mid-flight. This is an unrealistic assumption that needs to be corrected in
further developments of this paper. The significance of this fact is shown in
figure 3.13. However, it is observed from the simulation that the commanded
acceleration requirements mount drastically in a real-world PNG guidance
law based interceptor missile during the final stages of guidance.






























Figure 3.12: Case 3(H=0.02)
REAL-TIME PNG
Closing Velocity




























Figure 3.13: Case 3(H=0.02)
REAL-TIME PNG
Commanded Acceleration
By comparing figures 3.12 and 3.13 with figures 3.14 and 3.15 it is clearly
observed that an real-time non-ideal PNG system has more demanding ac-
celeration requirements that an ideal PNG system. This would lead to ac-
celeration requirements for intercept of the missile reaching saturation limits
and thus resulting in an intercept failure.
The effect of a real-world non-ideal PNG system is also felt on the final
miss distance, as illustrated in table 3.5. We see from table 3.5 that for a
real-world non-ideal PNG system the miss distances are too high to satisfy
the limits of miss distance less than 1 meter.
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Figure 3.14: Case 2(H=0.02)
IDEAL PNG
Closing Velocity






























Figure 3.15: Case 2(H=0.02)
IDEAL PNG
Commanded Acceleration
Table 3.5: Final miss distance comparison (Ideal v. Real Time PNG Law)
PNG Law Upate Interval, H (sec) Navigation Constant Miss Distance (Km)
Ideal 0.02 3 0.1204
Ideal 0.02 4 0.1391
Ideal 0.02 5 0.1492
RealWorld 0.02 3 2.3575
RealWorld 0.02 4 1.7095




This paper explores some of the technical difficulties that a country with
a limited missile capability would face in developing a kinetic-energy ASAT
capability. Such a capability requires an interceptor that can home with high
accuracy and high speed on a satellite, which presents significant technical
difficulties beyond those demonstrated in developing a limited missile capa-
bility. A country that possesses a limited missile capability therefore cannot
be assumed to have the ability to field such an ASAT capability.
This paper has operated under certain assumptions whose effect on this
judgement needs further exploration. Relaxing these assumptions is not ex-
pected to alter fundamentally the conclusion. First, the selected Proportional
Navigation Guidance (PNG) law is the simplest to operate. There are other
laws that are more accurate. PNG was chosen because it does not require
anything as input apart from the distance between the missile and target.
All other advanced laws require other inputs like closing velocity. This paper
assumes that Iran does not have an advanced radar capability and cannot
mount a radar seeker on its interceptor. If Iran is able to use an advanced
radar or is able to mount an radar on its ASAT warhead, then Iran could used
a better guidance law. The effect of such developments is left to future work.
The second issue that needs further study is the various systemic effects of
the real-time non-ideal fifth order PNG system. This would impose not only
a large acceleration requirement on the missile but would also reduce the
accuracy of the interceptor. These issues were not explored in detail in this
paper and warrant further analysis.
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